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ABSTRACT. – A large part of group differences in wages comes from unobserved or
unverifiable characteristics such as the intensity of human capital investments on-the-job.
This is notably the classical argument to account for gender differentials.We build a frame-
work in which training decisions are bilateral, in the presence of frictions in the labor market
generated by a flow-matching model. Workers make learning efforts while firm invest by
paying direct training costs. Under complementarity of the learning function of these two
inputs (effort and direct costs), the outcome of training decisions requires coordination bet-
ween the firm and the worker. We exhibit cases in which a high investment in training/high
effort Nash equilibrium is a dominant strategy, which makes discrimination between groups
difficult, and cases in which there is a coordination failure. We define coordination discrimi-
nation as a case in which observed characteristics of workers (gender, race, diploma) help
to coordinate on an equilibrium.We explore the case of unobservable types of workers, and
study under which conditions the (common knowledge) priors of firms do not affect the equi-
librium strategies, and under which conditions they play a crucial role instead.
Décisions bilatérales employeur-employé de formation et
une  application à la discrimination
RÉSUMÉ. – Une partie importante des différences de salaires entre groupes provient
de caractéristiques inobservables telles que l'intensité d'investissement en capital humain
dans l'emploi. Nous développons un modèle d'appariement avec frictions sur le marché du
travail dans lequel les décisions de formation sont bilatérales.Les travailleurs font des efforts
d'apprentissage alors que les firmes paient les coûts directs de formation. Nous montrons
qu'il existe des cas où investissement important en formation / effort élevé est une stratégie
dominante, ce qui implique que la discrimination entre groupes est difficile et d'autres cas où
il y a des défauts de coordination.
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A large part of individual differences in wages or employability comes from
unobserved characteristics. The conventional estimates of Mincer's wage
equations and more sophisticated extensions, in absence of worker's fixed
effects, capture at best 30 to 40 % of the variance in log wages. Inclusion of
proxy variables for ability (such as IQ tests, grades, etc...) does not add much
to the explanatory power of the extended Mincer equations. The fact that
there is a huge unexplained component makes it difficult to understand gender
or race differences in earnings. One obvious determinant of wages and wage
differences across groups is the intensity of past human capital investments of
the individuals observed in the samples of surveys. The first component of
human capital, i.e. schooling, is usually observed, but other on-the-job invest-
ments in human capital are typically not observed and have to be proxied by
experience in the labor market, itself proxied by “potential experience”, i.e.
basically age minus education.1
A part of the unexplained wage earnings gap between men and women can
thus be attributed to the poor quality of the proxy for experience. However, in
surveys where “true experience” is available, not much is added in terms of
explanatory power of wages.2 This suggests that what matters is not so much
the exact time spent working, but rather how much a worker and a firm have
invested in training to improve the productivity of the worker-firm associa-
tion. Here, we investigate the determinants of these bilateral training
decisions, and notably we focus on how racial or gender differences may lead
to large differences in the intensity of training, and under which circum-
stances discrimination between groups can be observed ex-post in wage
differences.
Our analysis is based on a simple two-person game. Two partners (inter-
preted here as a firm and a worker) match and produce some output, which
depends on bilateral training decisions, namely training efforts by workers
and training investments by firms. We base the analysis on the absence of
contractibility on these choice variables, due to unverifiability, as usual in
information economics. The way the inputs of both partners are combined
into the payoff structure of each agent is reflected by two dimensions,
complementarity and returns to scale.
Our results are as follows. High investments from both partners are associ-
ated with high returns to scale, low investments from both partners are
associated with low returns to scale, asymmetry of training decisions are asso-
ciated with substitutability of training and efforts, symmetry being instead
reinforced by complementarity. Finally, extreme complementarity leads to a
coordination incentive game for all values of returns to scale. We then argue
that our analysis of strategies of firms and workers can be seen as an exten-
sion of the concept of statistical discrimination introduced by PHELPS [1972]
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1. See for instance ANGRIST and KRUEGER [1999]
2. See ALTONJI and BLANK [1999] for an exhaustive discussion and references of these ideas and
those of the previous paragraph.and ARROW [1985a and b].3 We notably introduce a concept of “coordination
discrimination”, which arises when there are multiple Nash-equilibria if coor-
dination on one equilibrium is biased towards a group, and we discuss why
coordination by “cheap talk” is difficult in light of the analysis of LANG
[1986)] on language discrimination.4
We  develop the homogenous worker case, and undertake the comparative
statics of several economically relevant parameters. To do so, we need a more
fully integrated intertemporal framework, and use a matching framework à la
PISSARIDES [1990]. This is the only way to introduce in a parsimonious way the
outside option of firms vis-à-vis the workers, the expected discounted value of
unemployment of workers and the bargaining power of workers in the Nash-
bargaining game over wages. We also derive the average earnings of a group of
worker, as a function of the parameters of the game and of the equilibrium tran-
sition probability. The framework is extended to the homogenous (two types)
workers case, and we study the role of priors in a Bayesian context.
Then we extend the discussion of discrimination, by linking our paper to
taste discrimination and statistical discrimination. We also suggest an alterna-
tive form of discrimination: playing non-cooperative when the other plays
cooperative may be associated with a penalty, that might be lower if the oppo-
nent belongs to another social group. Such “default penalties” may help move
away from asymmetric equilibria or prisoner's dilemma games for majority
workers, but would not affect minorities. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section gives the main intuitions in
a simple set-up and discusses our notion of discrimination. Then we detail the
notations of the model in a more specific setup with discrete investment and
develop the equilibrium concepts (the continuous case is treated in Appendix
1.2). Section 4 derives some comparative statics with homogenous workers,
Section 5 introduces unobservable differences between workers and Section 6
further discusses discrimination in our setup. Section 7 briefly explores poten-
tial extensions and concludes.
2 Intuitions
Two agents (a firm and a worker) share a surplus depending on their initial
training decisions, hereafter denoted by e (effort of the worker) and i (invest-
ment of the firm). Let's denote by λ the function that associates those inputs.
We chose a CES investment function 
(1) λ(e,i) = (a0 + a1eρ + a2iρ)α/ρ
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3. Arrow [1985a and b], and many others, for instance COATE and LOURY [1993], SCHWAB [1986],
LUNDBERG and STARTZ [1983], discrimination arises because of a coordination failure. The typical
mechanism is that workers, expecting a lower return to their human capital investments (e.g.
because of noise in a productivity test, PHELPS [1972]), under-invest in human capital. This invest-
ment cannot be directly observed, and firms have a subjective probability that workers have indeed
invested. If workers in a given group tend to under-invest, firms attribute them a lower probability
of being skilled, and thus rationally pay them lower wages.
4. COATE and LOURY [1993] have a similar notion of coordination failure (based on group coordina-
tion, as opposed to bilateral coordination in our case), which may justify affirmative action.where the elasticity of substitution is σei = 1/(1 − ρ) and α captures scale
effects. This function is consistent with our assumptions, namely that a
productive job is the outcome of luck and bilateral training decisions, whereas
the levels of effort e and investement i is not verifiable and thus can not be
contracted. At this stage, simply consider that the payoff of each agents is an
increasing revenue function Rk, k = f,w of λ minus the cost of training,
assumed linear for each agent, i.e. −e or −i. An interpretation of high returns
to scale α could be the complexity of tasks in the job, while complementarity
of inputs can be seen as the fact that worker's learning without specific help of
the firms (example: use of machinery during training) is difficult. In other
words, complementarity may be a proxy for capital intensity of the business,
while substituability may reflect the case of service industries. 
We also assume that e and i can be chosen in a finite, discrete subset, and
notably that 
(2)
e ∈{ e0,e1} with 0  e0 < e1
i ∈{ i0,i1} with 0  i0 < i1
If we simplify the notation λ(eh,ik) to λhk for h,k = 0,1, then the payoff
matrix is 
 
Rw(λ00) − e0;Rf (λ00) − i0 Rw(λ01) − e0;Rf (λ01) − i1
Rw(λ10) − e1;Rf (λ10) − i0 Rw(λ11) − e1;Rf (λ11) − i1
 
To  give the main intuition, we simply focus of a few numerical examples,
derived from the more complex model of next section, but without entering
into the details. Those details will be provided in equation (7) and table 7,
representing the payoff structure and the parameter values respectively. At this
stage, it is simply useful to note that we use a symmetric parametrization
(a0 = 0, a1 = a2 = 0.5) for the CES investment function, letting the payoff
functions bear the asymmetries between workers and firms. We can then natu-
rally classify those examples into two categories, the symmetric cases and the
asymmetric cases, according to FUDENBERG and TIROLE's [1995] typology.
2.1  Symmetric equilibria
2.1.1  Single Pareto-optimal equilibrium (HH : high, LL : low)
Here, two cases can arise, referred to as the HH and the LL situations. In
the high investments equilibrium HH displayed in table 1, both parties have
individually interest to invest in training. This case arises when training
efforts are complements and when average productivity and/or returns to scale
are high enough. Indeed, in this case, both players have interest to coordinate
on symmetric strategies (efforts are complements), and the most rewarding
strategy is the higher level of investment (high returns on investment). Note
that this equilibrium is also Pareto-optimal.
320In the low investment equilibrium LL displayed in table 2, on the contrary,
both parties have interest not to invest in training, and this is the only Nash
equilibrium. This arises when the technology shows very low returns to scale,
when investment and efforts are complements, but also when they turn out to
be substitutes instead, if returns to scale are low enough. 
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i0 i1
e0 18.5;13.81 9 .7;14.8
e1 18.3;16.22 1 .3;20.7
TABLE 1
HH : Single Nash, Pareto-dominant (compared to (0,0)) equilibrium 
(ρ =− 1, α = 1.2)
i0 i1
e0 21.7;20.32 1 .9;19.2





LL : Single Nash, Pareto-dominant (compared to (1,1)) equilibrium
(ρ =− 1,α = 0.3)
TABLE 3
DP : Single Nash, Pareto-dominated equilibrium (ρ =− 1.5,α = 0.5)
2.1.2 Prisoners’ dilemma (DP)
The DP case is simply a special case of the LL equilibrium, in which the
only equilibrium is sub-optimal. The worker and the firm would jointly have
interest to coordinate on high investment levels, but they know the other party
would individually have interest to deviate in this case. This is a classic pris-
oners’dilemma problem. It arises whenever efforts are rather complements
(or weakly substitutes) and returns to scale are not too strong (otherwise HH
can arise as another equilibrium), but not too low either, (otherwise LL can
arise as an optimal equilibrium, or at least one party could be better off in this
situation compared to HH). See table 3 for an illustration.2.1.3 Coordination incentive (CI)
Another case arises when both the “high” and “low” equilibria exist. See
table 4 for an example. In such a case, one equilibrium is Pareto-dominant (in
our simulations, this is always the high equilibrium), which should give
incentives to both parties to coordinate in order to reach the latter. This case
arises whenever efforts are strongly complements and returns to scales not too
small. The intuition is that, if efforts were not sufficiently complements, LL
could not be a possible equilibrium. On the other hand, if returns to scale
happened to be too small, HH could not be a possible equilibrium. This case
is one of the example in which discrimination may arise, as argued later in
this section.5
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5. Finally, one could wonder if it is possible to observe another type of coordination problem, the
classical Battle-of-the-Sexes situation (BoS). This is a typical case requiring horizontal differences
in tastes, in which both parties prefer symmetric choices to anything else, but cannot a priori coor-
dinate on one or the other because they have different tastes. For instance, in case of two Nash
equilibria, LL and HH, the worker could be better off in the LL equilibrium but the firm would
prefer the HH equilibrium. We have not explored this situation here.
i0 i1
e0 20;16.8 20.4;16.1  
e1 19;17.5 21.2;20.5
TABLE 4
CI : Two Nash, Pareto-ranked equilibria (ρ =− 2.5,α = 0.8)
2.2 Asymmetric cases
There are also a few asymmetric situations that arise in equilibrium. These
situations, as we argue later on, are also useful in the analysis of discrimina-
tion.
2.2.1 Behavior convention (DH : Dove / Hawk)
In this case, two off-diagonal equilibria exist with an asymmetry in training
investments/efforts: one of the two parties bears all the training investment
cost. Which of both equilibria will apply depends on the behavior convention
assumed for both players. This case arises whenever efforts are strongly
substitutes and returns to scale high enough (otherwise there would be no
incentive to invest for one or the other party). Table 5 illustrates.BILATERAL WORKER-FIRM TRAINING DECISIONS 323
i0 i1
e0 18.5;13.8 22.0;19.4  
e1 20.6;20.8 21.3;20.7
TABLE 5
DH : Two Nash, unranked equilibria (ρ = 0.8,α = 1.2)
i0 i1
e0 21.1;18.9 22.1;19.7  
e1 20.7;21.1 21.1;20.3
TABLE 6
LH : Single Nash equilibrium (ρ = 0.5,α = 0.5)
6. This cannot be obtained with the benchmark values of the parameters, but it is a possible outcome
whenever the marginal impact of efforts is larger than the marginal impact of investments (as with
a1 = .8 and a2 = .2 for instance), or when the payoff function of the worker is sufficiently above
the payoff function of the employer. This arises later on when the bargaining power of workers is
significantly above .5 (the intuition is that this raises the marginal impact of worker's efforts) and
when their outside option is large, for reasons discussed in Section 4.1.
2.2.2 Lonely rider (LH : low / high)
Still in the asymmetric cases, there are situations where only one equilib-
rium prevails: the firm invests in training but the worker does not. This can
happen when efforts are substitutes or slightly complements, for different
levels of returns to scale, as in table 6. One could also exhibit the symmetric
HL (high/low) case in which the worker does invest but the firm does not.6
2.3 Partial conclusion
It is thus now clear that bilateral uncontractible decisions lead to several
different situations with drastically different economic outcomes. Our setup
is very general, and in partial equilibrium, we could interpret our model as
two parties undertaking an initial effort that can not be verified by a third
party. For instance, IRA and the British government making “peace efforts”,
or, Corsican nationalist and the French government, or, Palestinian leaders
and the Israeli government, are situations that could be modelled within our
game. The returns to scale and the substituability of these efforts will predict
the likely outcome of this game in each situation. We can now explain how
discrimination will emerge from our set-up.2.4 Coordination failures
Let us propose an interpretation of discrimination, quite natural in our
context because linked to coordination failure. In particular, there are two
types of situations in which coordination is required: the coordination incen-
tive case and the dove-hawk case. In both examples there is a multiplicity of
equilibria, and discrimination may arise if agents use gender or ethnic origin
as a coordination mechanism.
DEFINITION 1. Coordination discrimination arises when there are two equili-
bria, and  the coordination on one equilibrium is biased towards one group
of workers.
2.4.1 Symmetric equilibria, single type
According to this definition, with a single type of worker, only equilibria CI
and DH may be associated with Coordination Discrimination. In principle, in
the case of CI, the coordination on the high equilibrium is easy, since one of
the two equilibria is Pareto-superior to the other. It is sometimes considered
that a simple “cheap talk” can lead to the elimination of the Pareto-inferior
equilibrium. Assuming that the Pareto-inferior equilibrium is the LL equilib-
rium,7 then the resolution of the coordination problem leads to higher
investments from both parts, faster productivity gains and thus higher wages
in the cross-section. We tend to disagree on how easily cheap talk can resolve
the coordination problem, and three arguments can be opposed to this view.
First, the literature on discrimination has introduced the idea that communi-
cation might not be easy nor cheap in all cases, and notably that “language
discrimination” may arise. In his seminal contribution, LANG [1986] discusses
the effect of transaction costs introduced by the existence of language diffe-
rences, that may reflect either true differences in language, but also, more
pervasively but not less importantly, of dialects, of differences in intonations,
attitudes, gestures, that increase the noise of communication, leading to more
costly communication, or to communication misinterpretations. Combining
Lang's insight with our concept of coordination discrimination, we have an
alternative explanation of equilibrium differences in wages if, for instance,
white employers and employees coordinate on a Pareto-superior equilibrium,
while black employees and white employers have more difficulties to coordi-
nate and end-up randomly in one or the other equilibrium.
Second, FUDENBERG and TIROLE [1995] argue, following Schelling's concept
of focal points, that one can imagine several situations in which there exists
focalness of some strategies depending on the player's culture and past expe-
rience. If it is difficult to explain why two lost persons in Paris would decide
to wait for each other in front of the Eiffel Tower and not in front of the Sacré
Coeur, it is similarly difficult to explain why minority groups may face focal-
ness on the low equilibrium. This does not necessarily mean that this is not
what happens in several occasions. 
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7. which our simulation confirm in all cases we have studied.Finally, in order to help select an equilibrium when there are several, one
can also introduce the notion of risk-dominance, following HARSANYI and
SELTEN [1988]: some people may prefer an outcome to another if they believe
that the opponent randomizes (a;1 − a) on its own choice. We can easily
exhibits situations in which for a group of workers, there is obvious coordina-
tion on HH, while for the other, risk-dominance leads to the choice of the LL
equilibrium. Again, the perception of a may differ across groups, in a way
adversely affecting minorities. 
To sum up, the last three paragraphs have developed arguments against the
view that cheap talk can easily lead to the coordination on the right Pareto-
dominant strategy. Instead, there are several, subjective aspects and
dimensions along which specific groups can be adversely affected by the bila-
teral decisions made in the game. 
2.4.2 Asymmetric equilibria and reputation
Further, this concept of coordination discrimination can also be applied to
asymmetric cases. Indeed, in the DH equilibrium, it may be that minorities
spontaneously anticipate a low investment from the firm and wish to under-
take the high investment, while majority workers feel secure that the firm
makes the high investment while they do the low investment. Who will
support the entire costs of the training investments/efforts is entirely a matter
of convention.8
Of course, one can argue that in such an asymmetric situation, it would be
difficult to observe wage differences between groups, if the effort by black
workers in the LH case leads to as fast transition to high productivity as the
investment made by firms for white workers. Indeed, it is only if there is an
asymmetry in the function λ(e,i) and more precisely, if the returns to effort
are lower than the returns to investment by firms, that one would observe
differences in wages by groups. This is true, but there would still be utility
differences between groups, since Rw(λ01) − e0 would be higher than
Rw(λ10) − e1.9
A last comparative statics exercise may be to introduce a psychological or a
pecuniary penalty for misconduct of agents, such as playing L in CI, DH or
even DP. Assume now that the penalty for such a behavior is lower when the
two agents belong to different ethnic, gender or sociological groups. This
penalty (denote it by zw and zf) will shifts the curves 1 and 2 to the right in
figure 1. It thus reduces the likelihood of LH and DH, and raises CI. And,
again, if CI leads less frequently to HH for black workers than for white
workers, the existence of larger penalties in case of misconduct towards
majority members leads to more discrimination.
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8. Interestingly, the latter case, an asymmetric situation where workers are favored by employers at
their own expenses, can be seen as another view of the concept of nepotism (introduced by
GOLDBERG in [1982]) in which employers have a positive rate of substitution between profits and
the number of workers of the favored group (for instance, they wish to overemploy beautiful
women without any explicit profitability).
9. Later on introducing wages, and interpreting e as hours worked, one could also interpret the entry
wage   w/e as the hourly entry wage, and in this case it would be higher for white than for black
workers.2.4.3 Other links with the literature on discrimination
The idea of discrimination as coordination failure is present in ARROW
[1985a] and COATE and LOURY [1993]. In Coate and Loury notably, workers
have to choose their skill level taking into account the prior probability of
firms, which affect the expected payoff of the skills investments. COATE and
LOURY show cases in which there are two equilibria, one with low investment/
low prior and another one with high investment/high prior, leading to a coor-
dination problem. In our case, the investment choice by firm play a similar
role as the prior of the firm in their analysis. However, an important difference
with COATE and LOURY is that the game they model is sequential, a party
doing a pre-market investment first, while our analysis is based on simultane-
ous decisions being made. As such, in our model, coordination failures arise
not only because of firms’beliefs, but also because of workers’beliefs about
how firms will behave toward them. An additional difference between us and
COATE and LOURY is the nature of investments: specific and on-the-job in our
case, and general and pre-market in COATE and LOURY. 
Another relevant remark is that, as argued above, our concept of discrimina-
tion is close to Lang's discrimination by language, since sometimes language
cannot be used to better coordinate. However, in Section 6, we discuss how
our setup can be made consistent with other explanations of discrimination:
discrimination based on taste (BECKER [1957]) and statistical discrimination
(PHELPS [1972], and ARROW [1985a and b]).
3  A more specific setup
The remainder of the paper is devoted to understand under which exact
conditions these different situations occur. Time is continuous and agents are
risk-neutral. Let y be the optimal production of a job, and let   y < y be the
output produced by an untrained worker or a new entrant. It is assumed that
both financial resources and efforts lead to switch from the low productive to
the high productive state. Consistently with the previous section, we denote
by e the learning effort of the worker, and by i, the investment in training by
the firm at the entry level. Hereafter, “investment” will mean investment by
the firm in the training of the worker, while effort will mean the investment in
human capital by the worker.10
In absence of training, a worker may remain lowly productive for a long
time. As explained earlier, a CES investment function.
λ(e,i) = (a0 + a1eρ + a2iρ)α/ρ
captures the main channels through which e and i interact: the trick here is to
assume that λ is the Poisson intensity at which the match becomes produc-
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10. Note that training leads workers to acquire specific human capital. i.e. skills which cannot be used
in another firm. See BECKER [1964] for the fruitful distinction between general and specific skills.tive.11 Note that this is consistent with the assumption of unverifiability of
training decisions. The stochastic assumption of the efficiency of learning
effort is in the spirit of the Bayesian inference of JOVANOVIC and NYARKO
[1996]. The function e  → λ(e,.) can be thought as a learning curve, the func-
tion i  → λ(.,i) as a kind of production function. Assuming a1 and a2 to be
positive parameters, the higher the two inputs (effort and investment), the
lower the expected duration of the low productivity state.
The effort and investment decisions are made at the entry level, and cannot
be observed at the time of decision, or verified in any way afterwards. The
firms’motivation for providing training is profit maximization. The workers’-
motivation for making the effort of learning is to get a higher wage when the
surplus of the match is higher: the higher the anticipated wage increase, the
higher the learning effort.
The sequence of events is the following: workers and firms meet. The
worker receives an entry wage   w that is exogenous (it may be interpreted as a
minimum wage). Workers and firms anticipate that, after the training period,
the wage will be bargained through a surplus sharing rule. Anticipating this
wage, workers and firms choose their reciprocal investment taking the reac-
tion of the other player as given: both e and i are chosen such as to maximize
the present discounted value of the job for the worker and the firm respec-
tively. 
Given the unverifiability of efforts and investments, and the fact that they
cannot be deduced for sure from the time of transition to the higher produc-
tive state (this is a typical situation of contract theory in which the observed
outcome is a combination of luck and effort), we don't allow in our model for
the possibility of a contract that would insure the optimality of training deci-
sions. In fact, and in line with the incomplete contract literature (e.g. see
MALCOMSON [2000]), it can be demonstrated that in this theoretical setup,
decentralized investments are always lower than efficient investments. The
only case in which one of the partner invests the efficient amount of training
is when he/she receives the integrality of the productivity increase, a classical
hold-up case.12
At a steady-state, the asset values of the state “unemployment”, “employed
low productive”, “employed high productive” and of a job with low produc-
tivity and a job with high productivity are respectively:13
(3)
r   E =  w + λ(e,i)(E −   E) + s(U −   E)
rE =w + s(U − E)
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11. See WASMER [1999] for this setup and some macroeconomic consequences of training decisions.
12. This result was proved within this setup by WASMER [1999].
13. Continuous time is not needed here, since there are actually three periods: the entry level where
investment is made, the low productive state and the high productive state occuring randomly.
However, we decided to keep this continuous time structure to introduce the usual matching
framework that would allow us to obtain unemployment as the outcome of job creation/job
destruction, and also to conveniently introduce the impact of training decisions. A discrete time
setup is more involving, since we need to check that the number of match per period is below the
initial stocks of job seekers and job vacancies.and
r   J =   y −   w + λ(e,i)(J −   J) + s(V −   J)
rJ = y − w + s(V − J)
(4)
where   w and w are the wages in each state. These arbitrage equations read as
the equality between the equity value of being in a given state and the flow
income given instantaneous transition probabilities of moving to other
states.14
The wage is bargained in the productive stage according to a generalized
Nash-bargaining game. The bargaining parameter of workers is denoted by β,
and the wage follows the conventional rule
w = (1 − β)rU + β(y − rV)
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14. Our model focusses on the partial equilibrium properties of this game and we take U and V as
given. However, in a general equilibrium setup, one would have that U and V depend on transition
probabilities (the exit rate of unemployment and the recruitment rate of firms).
15.  An analysis of the case in which the decisions of firms and workers are taken in a continuous set
is derived in Appendix.
TABLE 7
Baseline parameter values
rU rV   yy  wβr s a0 a1 a2 e0 = i0 e1 = i1
11 03 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.5
Replacing, we have that
(5) E = U + β(y − rU − rV)/(r + s)
(6) J = V + (1 − β)(y − rU − rV)/(r + s)
Given the discrete structure of bilateral training decisions according to
assumption (2), we have a typical game theory setup in which workers and
employers play strategically. Agents face a finite number of possible strate-
gies.15 Then, comparing payoffs in each case, we examine all the possible
solutions of the training investment game. 
The payoff of this game in each four cases is easy to compute. It is given
by   E(e,i) − e (resp.   J(e,i) − i). Note that, given that the wage is bargained
after the realization of the transition to the high productivity state, the wage
and accordingly, both E and I are independent of (e,i).
Denoting by ω =   w + sU and π =   y −   w + sV, and condensing the nota-






r + s + λ00
− e0;
π + λ00J
r + s + λ00
− i0
ω + λ01E
r + s + λ01
− e0;
π + λ01J
r + s + λ01
− i1
ω + λ10E
r + s + λ10
− e1;
π + λ10J
r + s + λ10
− i0
ω + λ11E
r + s + λ11
− e1;
π + λ11J





We can now detail how the payoff matrix of the previous section was calcu-
lated, by showing in table 7 the values of the parameters. Note also that, if   y
was too small, one may have that   E − e < U or that   J − i < V; in other
words, we need to check that the participation constraints hold for both the
worker and the firm. In fact, these constraints are satisfied provided that
λ(e0,i0) is above zero and thus that the gain from the transition to the produc-
tive state is large enough. This is why, in table 7, e0 = i0 > 0. We are now
able to formally derive the frontiers and identify the areas of the different
equilibrium strategies in the space parameter.
3.1 Frontiers
In adequately choosing the parameter values, we can draw, in the space
parameter (ρ,α), the areas of each equilibrium and various frontiers. See
figure 1. These equations defining the frontiers are:
(1)   J00 =   J01 ⇔ i1(r + s + λ01) − i0(r + s + λ00) = (λ01 − λ00)[J(r + s) − π]
(2)   E00 =   E10 ⇔ e1(r + s + λ10) − e0(r + s + λ00) = (λ10 − λ00)[E(r + s) − ω]
(3) E11 = E01 ⇔ e1(r + s + λ11) − e0(r + s + λ01) = (λ11 − λ01)[E(r + s) − ω]
(4)   J11 =   J10 ⇔ i1(r + s + λ11) − i0(r + s + λ10) = (λ11 − λ10)[J(r + s) − π]
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FIGURE 1
Frontiers and equilibria with benchmark values of the parametersTheir interpretation is quite straightforward: the left hand-side is a measure
of the marginal costs of investment while the right-hand side is a measure of
the marginal gain of this investment (simply write i1 = i0 + di and
e1 = e0 + de and take a first-order approximation for small di and de to see
this). The sketch of the calculation of the slope of these curves is in 
Appendix 1.1.
4  The single worker's type case
4.1 Comparative statics
We have so far treated the outside option of agents (U for workers and V for
firms) as parameters, in a partial equilibrium context.16 Consistently, we
analyze the impact of these parameters on the equilibrium strategies.
4.1.1 Higher equity value of unemployment
First, when  U increases the value of high productivity employment for
workers increases directly and also indirectly through the rise in the negoti-
ated wage. Thus, for workers to be indifferent between making high or low
effort, knowing the firm will provide low training i0 (  E00 =   E10), efforts and
investments should be more complements: frontier (2) shifts to the left.
Equivalently, if one is initially on the frontier (2) and that U rises, workers
won't be indifferent any longer and will invest (  E00 <   E10) : they now stand
to the right of frontier (2). Similarly, for workers to be indifferent between
making low or high effort, knowing this time that firms will provide high
training (  E11 =   E01), efforts and investments should be more substituable
(which also means returns to scale should be smaller since the curve is
monotonously increasing): frontier (3) shifts to the right.
As for firms, an increase in U reduces profits of high productivity jobs.
Thus, for firms to be indifferent between investing or not, knowing the worker
will supply low effort (  J00 =   J01), efforts and investments should be more
substitutable: frontier (1) shifts to the right. Finally, for firms to be indifferent
between investing or not, knowing workers will provide high effort
(  J11 =   J10), efforts and investments should be more complements (which
also means returns to scale should be higher since the curve is monotonously
increasing) : frontier (4) shifts to the left.
To sum up, frontiers (1) and (3) in figure 1 shifts to the right while frontiers
(2) and (4) shifts to the left. Consequently, the areas where respectively CI
and DH prevail enlarge, and the area where LH prevails shrinks. So, an
increase in the outside option of workers induces a relative increase in the
value of high productivity jobs, inducing equilibria CI and DH to happen
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16. Those values can be calculated in general equilibrium using a free-entry condition for firms and
introducing an endogenous job finding rate workers. This is left to future work.more often for various values of αand ρ than before the increase. The effect
on the likelihood of HH and LL is ambiguous. Note that for high values of the
outside option, the case were only workers invest HL is a possible outcome of
the game: the reason is simply that, the higher U, the higher the return to
workers’efforts because of higher wage w.
4.1.2 Higher threat point of firms
When V increases, the value of high productivity jobs for firms increases
directly and also indirectly through the fall in the negotiated wage. So, fron-
tiers (1) and (3) in figure 1 shift to the left while frontiers (2) and (4) shift to
the right for reasons exactly similar to those explained in the analysis of the
effect of higher U. Consequently, the areas where respectively CI and DH
prevail tend to shrink, and the area where LH prevails tends to enlarge. An
increase in the outside option of firms induces a relative increase in the value
of high productivity jobs, inciting firms to invest more in training even though
workers do not. But by reducing the associated wage, it decreases the value of
high productivity employment for workers which, in turn, induces them not to
invest in training. The impact on LL and HH is still ambiguous.
4.1.3 Asymmetries in bargaining strength
We can analyze the effect of bargaining power of workers β: an increase in
β will have the same impact on the frontiers as an increase in U or a decrease
in V, the intuition being that the returns to firms’ investments are reduced
while payoffs of efforts of workers are raised. To combine the insight of the
previous paragraphs, we can derive an alternative representation of the equi-
librium: the equilibrium strategies can be represented in the space parameter
(rU;β) in figure 2. Note that equilibrium HL is now observed as an outcome
for large U, as discussed in footnote 6.
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FIGURE 2
Different equilibria in the space parameter (rU,β) for  ρ =− 1 and
α = 0.75.4.1.4 Productivity of the match
Finally, when job production y increases, the value of jobs increases for
both workers (increased wage) and firms (increased profits). In turn, for both
workers and firms to be indifferent between not investing or investing
knowing the other party would not invest anyway would require investments
and efforts to be more complements (frontiers (1) and (2) shifts leftward).
Symmetrically, for both workers or firms to be indifferent between investing
or not knowing the other party would invest anyway would take efforts to be
more substitutes or returns to scale to decrease (frontiers (3) and (4) shift
rightward). So, overall, the area where the HH equilibrium prevails enlarges
when economic conditions improve for jobs associated to training. The
comparative statics of discount factors r + s is postponed to Section 5.2 to
avoid repetitions.
4.2 Average wage earnings
To  introduce the discussion of group earnings differentials of the next
sections, let us now calculate the average wage of a given group of worker.
We denote by   N the number of workers at the entry level of productivity and
by  N −   N the number of workers with productivity y; N is thus the total
number of employed workers. Let's denote by φkl, k,l = 0,1 the fraction of
entry workers in a match where investments k,l are chosen. Denoting by
  =
 
k,l φklλkl the expected probability of transition towards the high
productivity state of a given population of entry workers, we have:
∂(N −   N)/∂t =    N − s(N −   N)
In a steady state, flows are in equilibrium and thus   N/(N −   N) = s/  or
equivalently,
  N/N =
1
1 +  /s
.
The average wage of workers is given by 




(  w − w)
Given w>  w,i t is clear that the lower  , the lower the average wage, or,
naturally, the higher the investments on-the-job, the higher the average wage.
Note that, when there is a single Nash equilibrium, φkl = 0 except for k,l of
the equilibrium strategies. When there are no pure equilibrium or conversely,
multiple pure equilibria, φkl may reflect randomness of choices as in mixed
strategies for instance. When there are multiple types of workers, as in the
next lines, φkl may reflect the fraction of the groups choosing between the
different strategies.
332In what follows, we will introduce two types of agents in a Bayesian equi-
librium context and analyze wage differences. Then we will discuss various
concepts of discrimination in light of our bilateral investment setup.
5  Two types of workers
5.1 Setup
Suppose now that there are two types of workers, who only differ when
training investments and efforts have been made: the high productive g (good)
yield a revenue yg, the low productive b (bad) yield a revenue yb < yg.
However, we assume the level of discrete efforts is the same for both types
without loss of generality. We also assume that firms have a prior about the
distribution of the two kinds of workers: a proportion p is of the low type and
a proportion 1 − p is of the high type. This prior distribution is common
knowledge among firms and workers. Given the structure of the investment
game, the possible revisions of these priors will take place after investment
levels are revealed and thus have no impact on the decisions made (which are
sunk).
The present discounted values of employment   Ex
hk and  Ex for x = g,b,a r e
given by substituting y by yx in equations (3) and (5), and the present discount
value of jobs   Jx
hk and Jx is given by the same substitution in equations (4) and (6).
Ex-ante,w orkers know for sure their payoff as a function of h,k but firms
ignore the type x and therefore consider two payoff matrices, each one deter-
mining the equilibria. They then select their optimal decision based on the
expected value of their payoff, conditional on the optimal strategies being




00 − e0;   Jx
00 − i0   Ex
01 − e0;   Jx
01 − i1
  Ex
10 − e1;   Jx
10 − i0   Ex




Note that the cases p = 0, and p = 1 are equivalent to the previously studied
one-type-of-worker case. We will now show how the value of p will drasti-
cally affects the nature of the potential equilibrium.
5.2  Strategy of the firm
Let us introduce the benchmark values of ρ0 =− 1 and α0 = 0.75 as a
reference point, such that the equilibrium lies in HH in one case (p = 0) and
in LL in the other case (p = 1), as displayed in figures 3 and 4. The reference
point is labelled A on these graphs, somewhere close to the 
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FIGURE 3
p equals 0 : all workers produce y = 3
FIGURE 4
p equals 1 : all workers produce y = 2
intersection of frontiers (1) and (3) in figure 1. With p = 0,w e   are
in HH, and thus have   E
g
11 >   E
g
01;    J
g





00 >   E
g
10;   J
g
00 <   J
g
01. Assume ow that, when p = 1,w e   are in LL with
  Eb
00 >   Eb
10;   Jb
00 >   Jb
01, and additionally   Eb
11 <   Eb
01;   Jb
11 <   Jb
10. Accordingly, the payoff faced by a firm if she plays i1 is given by
p  Jb
01 + (1 − p)   J
g
11. Deviating from this strategy and playing i0 instead,
would yield p  Jb
00 + (1 − p)   J
g
10. So the firm will not deviate from strategy i1
if p  Jb
01 + (1 − p)   J
g
11  p  Jb
00 + (1 − p)   J
g
10, which gives, after rearranging,
the following condition:17
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17. This inequality holds as a condition for the firm playing i1 only if the denominator is positive, as
it is actually the case in the simulations below. If it was negative, one would require p to be larger
than the ratio of the denominator to the numerator.
TABLE 8
Conditions on p for low and high equilibria to hold


















p  0.36 p  0.54
(8) p <
π + λ11Jg
r + s + λ11
−
π + λ10Jg
r + s + λ10
− (i1 − i0)
π + λ00Jb
r + s + λ00
−
π + λ01Jb
r + s + λ01
+
π + λ11Jg
r + s + λ11
−
π + λ10Jg
r + s + λ10








. Note that this condition varies according to the value of para-
meters, and in particular the difference between y and  yb: the higher the
difference between these productivity levels, the lower the threshold level
under which the firm will always invest i0. 
Now, playing i0 would yield p  Jb
00 + (1 − p)   J
g
00 while deviating from this
strategy, playing  i1 instead would yield p  Jb
01 + (1 − p)   J
g
01. So, i0 is an
equilibrium strategy for firms if p  Jb
00 + (1 − p)   J
g
00  p  Jb
01 + (1 − p)   J
g
01
which gives the following no-deviation condition on strategy i0 :
(9) p >
 
π + λ01Jg 
r + s + λ01
−
π + λ00Jg
r + s + λ00
+ (i1 − i0)
λ01
 
Jb − Jg 




Jb − Jg 










the higher the difference between y and  yb the lower the threshold above
which this equilibrium will hold. Using parameter values as in table 7, with
yg = y, simulations in table 8 show that above some threshold on p,18 both
types of equilibria can hold.
5.3 Interpretation
One can see that, by superposition of the figures 3 and 4, there are areas of
the parameters in which the priors p do not matter, while there are areas in
which those priors drastically matter, as is the case for the values α0 and ρ0
chosen above. For such values of the parameters, priors of the firms have a
huge impact on the behavior of workers. Notably, even though extreme priors
of the firms (p = 0 or p = 1) lead to a single equilibrium, there are interme-
diate priors leading to a multiplicity of equilibria. This indicates the crucial
role of the priors of the firms: in the first column of table 8, it is notably
shown that, when expectations of the firms are low enough (p > 0.36),
workers of the good group can anticipate the coordination on a LL equilib-
rium, while such a case in never possible when expectations are good enough
(low p). Of course, the higher yb, the higher the cutoff point for p above
which the second equilibrium occurs. We come back in next Section on the
implications of these coordination problems. 
We explore more at length in Appendix 1.2 the wage earnings differences
between the two groups of workers, and extend this analysis to the case of
white workers and black workers.
6  More discussion about discrimination
As argued above, our framework allows for several interpretations in terms
of discrimination. We first discuss the most straightforward applications of
our setup to the existing literature (taste and statistical discrimination), and
then rapidly extend our concept of coordination discrimination in the case of
two types of workers. 
6.1 Statistical discrimination
There are typically two dimensions of statistical discrimination, one based
on adverse selection (truly or wrongly, black workers may be perceived as
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18. Inequalities (8) and (9) are based on the fact that, in the subsequent simulations, the term in the
denominator is positive for the first inequality, and negative in the second one, which in the latter
case induces a change in the direction of the inequality.less productive) and the other linked to moral hazard (for instance, minority
workers or women may exogenously quit more frequently). Let us discuss
both dimensions in our model. 
That lower productivity leads to lower wage is easy to understand when
bargained wages partly reflect productivity. What happens in addition in our
analysis is that a lower productivity parameter y is also going to reduce
human capital investments. This amplifies wage gaps between black and
white workers. Indeed, when y increases, we saw that HH was a less likely
outcome: frontiers (1) and (2) shift rightward, frontiers (3) and (4) shift left-
ward.
Similarly, if firms expect black to be high turnover workers (higher r + s),
the high investment areas will be reduced. The reason is that an increase in
the turnover rates diminishes proportionally more the actualized value of
future high productivity jobs than the actualized value of current jobs (the
latter being discounted at rate λ + r + s). So to keep   E00 =   E10 and
  J00 =   J01,e f forts need to be more substitutes: frontiers (1) and (2) shift right-
ward. Inversely, to keep   J11 =   J10 and    E11 =   E01 under these new
conditions, efforts should be more complements (or returns to scale should be
higher: frontiers (3) and (4)). So, the area where the HH equilibrium prevails
shortens to the benefits of the areas where CI, DH and LL respectively
prevail. 
6.2 Taste discrimination
BECKER [1957] introduced taste discrimination as negatively affecting the
utility of employers with respect to black employment. In that sense, once a
black worker has been matched to an employer, the relative value of the
match for the employer with respect to its outside option V is made lower. Let
us assume that this is modelled by higher V. We saw in Section 4.1.2 that
higher V leads to lower likelihood of the HH equilibria.  
In addition, simulations we made in the continuous effort/investment cases,
as evidenced in the table displayed in Appendix 8.2, show that the effect of a
larger V for a given level of production y leads to lower effort by workers and
in many cases, to lower effort by firms, but that the decline in the effort by
workers is much larger than the decline in the investment by firms. This is
simply due to the fact that a higher V also raises profits of the firms after wage
are negotiated, thus raising the payoffs of investments. At the same time, it
reduces the payoff of workers, drastically reducing their investments. In other
words, when the employer expresses its preference for other workers outside
the firm, she is in a better bargaining position, but this discourages her worker
and reduces the transition probability to the high productive state. This even
reduces its own investment, in virtue of the complementarity between effort
and investment. 
We have thus an interesting situation in which, because of taste discrimina-
tion by employers, workers reduce their learning efforts, while employers do
not change their investment. In such a case, punishing discriminatory prac-
tices will be very difficult. 
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type of workers
In Section 5.2, we saw that, even in situations in which certainty about
workers’types leads to single HH or LL equilibria, uncertainty (in that case,
0 < p < 1) leads to multiple equilibria among which even good types may do
the low effort. We can make a parallel between this example and
Phelps’[1972] concept of statistical discrimination. In his model, there is
some uncertainty about the quality of a group of workers. Let us assume that
there are white workers whose post-transition productivity is perceived as
being y, and black workers that can be of two types, the low and high types
with productivity yb and yh described in the previous section, p reflecting the
proportion of low types in the group of black workers. In this case, white
workers and firms coordinate on the HH equilibrium, but for black workers,
some sufficiently bad priors by firms can lead these workers, even of the good
type, to anticipate that the firm will chose the low investment, and thus, to
select themselves a low level of investment.
7 Concluding  comments
We have developed a framework to analyze on-the-job investments by both
workers and firms. Competitive forces leading one or the other part to finance
all the investment are annihilated by several aspects of the model: first, human
capital generated by training is assumed here to be purely specific, while in
the case of general human capital investments, BECKER [1964] showed that
the workers finance them through lower entry wages. Second, frictions in the
labor market reduce the role of outside options of agents in the determination
of equilibrium payoffs. Third, the entry wage is exogenous, although this
assumption is not crucial here. Finally, effort and investment in training are
made at the entry level and, not being verifiable, cannot be contracted upon,
leading to incompleteness and inefficiencies. It is firmly believed that these
assumptions capture important ingredients of many bilateral relationships, far
beyond the labor market. It may for instance be a good benchmark to analyze
peace talks in which there are unobservable (or not verifiable by a third-party)
efforts really made by negotiators to reduce the activity of their “extremists”. 
This paper being partly exploratory, we have then discussed the different
cases we obtain as a function of the complementarity of the decisions of the
two partners as well as of the total returns to scale of these decisions. We have
then used this setup to analyze wage earnings differentials and discrimination.
We have quite naturally introduced the concept of “coordination discrimina-
tion” in which the existence of multiple Nash equilibria in the
investment/effort strategies can lead to systematically biased outcomes for
some groups. We have discussed how language discrimination can arise in
such a case, and also how social penalties for misconduct can reduce/amplify
group differences. When further introducing unobserved types of one side of
338the market (here, workers differing by their productivity), we have showed
how perceptions by the other side affect the equilibrium strategies. We finally
extend the analysis to statistical and taste discrimination. 
Our future work has two main directions. The first one is to derive the
general equilibrium properties of the model, in which firms’decisions of
creating jobs are endogenous. The second one is to derive the updating of the
perceptions from firms of the various fractions of the types of agents in a
Bayesian setup. 
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340APPENDIX
1.1 Slopes of the frontiers in the discrete investment
case
To  obtain the slopes of these curves, we need first to calculate dλ with




















the sign of which is not obvious. One can however see that, the lower the
arguments of λ, the more likely ∂λ/∂ρ has opposite sign as ρ.
It follows that, for negative ρ, the effect of an increase in α will raise the






a2lni.iρ). If λ(e0,i0) is very




1.2 Continuous reciprocal investment.
1.2.1 First order conditions
We now assume that e,i can be chosen in a range [0,+∞[ and that λee < 0,
λii < 0. Using the notation  x for the difference between x and    x for
x = w,y ,J and E,t he maximization of respectively   E − e for the workers,
and   J − i for the firm actually leads to two first order conditions on effort e










λi(y −  w)
(r + s + λ)2 = 1
Let us denote by  e(e,i) and  i(e,i) the functions determining the best
response of workers and firms respectively. We have
 e(e,i) = λe w − (r + s + λ(e,i))2 = 0
 i(e,i) = λi(y −  w) − (r + s + λ(e,i))2 = 0



























= λee w − 2(r + s + λ)λe < 0
∂ e
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= λei w − 2(r + s + λ)λi = Kλe(σei −
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= λei(y −  w) − 2(r + s + λ)λe = Kλi(σei −
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= λii(y −  w) − 2(r + s + λ)λi < 0
with  K =





. It is this clear that the workers
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and decreasing otherwise. Note that 
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Best response curves of the worker and the firm in the continuous case :
(a)  training efforts are strongly complement and returns to scale are
constant; 
(b) training efforts are complement and returns to scale are small; 
(c) training efforts are substitute and returns to scale are constant.One can easily show that an increase in the option value of worker or,
equivalently, an increase in the relative bargaining power of workers, would
increase the level of wage received when the job become highly productive.
Hence, the best response of workers would shift up.
1.2.2 Multiple types, full observability of types
The setup is simply a twofold version of the previous one-population set up.
Indeed, upon contracting with workers, we assume that firm know their types
for certain, and that this type reveals without uncertainty the exit option
values Uh,Vh with h = B,W. Suppose, as described above, that UB > UW
and VB > VW. Suppose also that both type of workers receive the same wage
  w when jobs are not productive. Defining eh and ih as the investment levels
chosen respectively by workers and firms of type h and firms employing a
worker of type h one must simply find the values solving separately the
following best response curves systems :
 e(eh, ih) = λeh(wh −   w)− (r + s + λ(eh,ih))2 = 0
 i(eh, ih) = λih(y − wh +   w)− (r + s + λ(eh,ih))2 = 0
with
wh = (1 − β)rUh + β(y − rVh)
Now, the average rate for both types of populations is simply :
wh = wh + 1
1+ /s(  w − wh)
since all workers within a group and all firms show identical preferences.
Simulations evidence the impact of taste discrimination for various values
of the transition technology parameters ρ and σ. Using the same values for all
other parameters as in table 7, except for the exit option value of firms
employing type B workers (rVB = 1.3), one gets :
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ρα eW iW λW wW eB iB λB wB
−3.0 1.0 0.62 0.74 0.67 1.37 0.58 0.73 0.64 1.23 
−1.0 0.6 0.37 0.52 0.61 1.36 0.33 0.53 0.59 1.22
+0.5 1.0 0.32 1.27 0.72 1.38 0.23 1.47 0.72 1.25
It is remarkable to see that the lower λ for black workers is mostly due to a
decline in their own effort, while the lower investment by the firm is propor-
tionally much more limited. This is because wages incorporate the outside
option of workers, and that the marginal returns to investment is increased by
a larger V for black workers, while the marginal return to black workers’ef-
fort is strongly reduced.1.2.3 Multiple types, incomplete observability of types
We  build an incomplete information framework to analyze the impact of
statistical discrimination on wage differentials between two types of workers
indexed, as above, by h = B,W. But now, let us assume that workers of type
B can be of two kinds once training investments have been made: the low
productive BL, and the high productive BH. Let us assume that firms have a
prior distribution of the two kinds of B workers : a proportion p is low
productive and a proportion 1 − p is high productive. This prior distribution
is common knowledge among firms and workers. Given the structure of the
investment game, no revisions of these priors will take place after investment
levels are revealed.
As for W workers, the setup is unchanged. The W investment Nash solu-
tions (eW,iW) solve the following equations:
 e(eW,iW) = λeW(wh −   w)− (r + s + λ(eW,iW))2 = 0
 i(eW,iW) = λiW(y − wW +   w)− (r + s + λ(eW,iW))2 = 0
As for B workers, firms have to decide what level iB of training to invest
given the distribution of high and low productivity workers:
iB = argmax p
   J BL − iB 
+ (1 − p)
   J BH − iB 
with
(11)
r   Jh =   y −   w + λ(eh,iB)(Jh −   Jh) + s(V −   Jh)
rJh = yh − wh + s(V − Jh)





(yBL −  wBL)
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(yBL −  wBH)
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eBH,iB  2 = 1
High and low productivity workers have to decide separately of their effort




(wh −   w)
(r + s + λ(eh,iB))2 = 1




solves the three previous equations.
Finally, intra-group average wages are 
wW = wW +
1
1 +  W/s
(  w − wW)
344and
wB = (  N B/N B)  w +
 









= (  N B/N B)  w +
 











1 +  /s













Given parameters in table 7, except with yW = yBH = 3, yBL = 2.5 and
with p = 0.5
ρα eW iW λW wW eBL eBH λBL λBH iB wB
−3.0 1.0 0.62 0.74 0.67 1.37 0.54 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.70 1.25
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